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‘We Met the Enemy and He is Us’:




South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy has disappointed scholars and
activists who expected the post-apartheid state to promote democracy and
human rights in Africa and the world, and who complain that it has failed
to fulfill that promise.
This paper examines South Africa’s role in democracy promotion since
1994 and, in particular, the argument that it intended to promote rights
and freedoms in Africa but was forced to change its approach by power
realities on the continent. It finds this explanation wanting and argues that
the core goal of foreign policy of the post-apartheid government was not to
promote democracy, but rather, merely to prove white racism wrong.
Since 1994, the African National Congress-led government has been aware
that much of white opinion, at home and abroad, expects majority ruled
African societies to fail. Its prime concern, therefore, has been to refute the
prejudice that black Africans cannot run successful societies. It is this con-
cern which has underpinned foreign policy: the aim has been to project
Africa as a continent whose states are measuring up to the Northern model
of a successful society. Hence, democracy promotion has been only a means
to that end, and this is the major factor responsible for its uneven and
sporadic application.
* Director, Centre for the Study of Democracy, Rhodes University/University of
Johannesburg. Email: sef53@mweb.org.za; sfriedman@uj.ac.za
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Résumé
La politique étrangère postapartheid de l’Afrique du Sud a déçu les
universitaires et les activistes qui s’attendaient à ce que l’État postapartheid
fasse la promotion de la démocratie et des droits de l’homme en Afrique et
dans le monde, et qui se plaignent qu’il n’ait pas réussi à tenir cette promesse.
Cet article examine le rôle de l’Afrique du Sud dans la promotion de la
démocratie depuis 1994 et, en particulier, l’argument selon lequel elle avait
l’objectif de promouvoir les droits et les libertés en Afrique, mais qu’elle a été
contrainte de changer son approche par les réalités du pouvoir sur le conti-
nent. L’article défend que cette explication se révèle insuffisante, et soutient
que l’objectif essentiel de la politique étrangère du gouvernement
postapartheid n’était pas de promouvoir la démocratie, mais plutôt de
simplement prouver que le racisme blanc avait tort.
Depuis 1994, le gouvernement dirigé par le Congrès national africain (ANC)
est conscient du fait que la plupart des blancs, au pays et à l’étranger,
s’attendent à ce que les sociétés africaines gouvernées par une majorité noire
sont vouées à l’échec. Son premier souci a donc été de réfuter les préjugés
selon lesquels les Africains noirs sont incapables de diriger leurs sociétés avec
succès. C’est cette préoccupation qui a sous-tendu la politique étrangère:
l’objectif a été de projeter l’Afrique comme un continent dont les États sont
à la hauteur du modèle de société prospère du Nord. Par conséquent, la
promotion de la démocratie a été seulement un moyen à cette fin, et c’est le
principal facteur responsable de son application inégale et sporadique.
Introduction
Expectations that a democratic South Africa would promote democracy
and stability in Africa were articulated within minutes of democracy’s
achievement on May 10, 1994.
The inauguration of Nelson Mandela as first President was attended
by then United States Vice-president Al Gore who is said to have taken
him aside and requested his minutes-old government to send peace-
keepers to Rwanda (Adebajo 2006). The United States was to make
further appeals to the new government to play a leading role in stabilis-
ing Africa – raising inevitable objections that it saw South Africa as a
useful means of deflecting pressures for engagement in messy conflicts:
‘To more cynical observers, it was a way of letting the international com-
munity, and particularly the West, off the African hook’ (Barber 2004:85-
86). While the goal was ostensibly to end conflicts, democratisation was
an implied concern – then US secretary of state Warren Christopher
raised the Nigerian junta and a coup in Burundi as potential areas for
intervention in 1996 (US Department of State 1996). And expecta-
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tions – within the country and among international actors – that South
Africa would become a force for democratisation in Africa were strong
(Seymour 1996). A new democracy, seen by many as a miraculous ex-
pression of the democratic ethos, was expected to seek to export it to
the rest of the continent, and perhaps beyond.
South African democratising efforts have fallen significantly short of
expectations (van Aardt 1996) – even allowing for the reality that what
is expected from an iconic new government will far exceed the possible.
While it may claim some successes, gains have been far less visible than
we might expect from a state whose economy dwarfs all others on the
continent and whose political capital as the product of Africa’s success-
ful fight against apartheid should give it moral weight. And perhaps the
most important challenge to its democratising intent and capacity, its
response to Zimbabwe, has been a conspicuous failure (Sachikonye 2005)
which has also tarnished its moral lustre and reduced its credibility. While
it is unfair to say that South Africa has done nothing to meet the expec-
tations, it has not exerted the influence its assets seemed to give it.
This article, in particular, takes issue with explanations which see the
limitations of South African democratisation as a case of an ‘idealist’
foreign policy adjusting to external realities (Barber 2004; Lodge n.d.).
While acknowledging that promoting democracy elsewhere is difficult
and that attempts by South Africa to do this in Africa are particularly so,
it challenges the assumption of a South Africa eager to spread freedom
and an African reality determined to resist it. It argues, rather, that South
African policy has been ambiguous since 1994 and remains so. It seeks
to show that these ambiguities are rooted in a domestic reality in which
conflicting visions of democracy and its promotion contend – and that
the complexities of South Africa’s own efforts to democratise play a
crucial role in shaping its responses to African democratisation. This
suggests a need for analyses of international democracy promotion to
examine how complexities in democracy promoting states affect their
capacity to spread democracy.
 Post-Apartheid South Africa and Democracy Promotion
South Africa’s democracy promotion experience can be divided into three
phases: while there is a rough chronology, one does not follow another
in strict date order. This seeming progression in policy and action is,
however, thrown into disarray by an apparent anomaly – its policy to-
wards Zimbabwe.
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Dashed Expectations
The newly-elected African National Congress government was partly
responsible for encouraging the expectation that it would energetically
promote democracy.
A 1993 article by Nelson Mandela in Foreign Affairs which declared
that ‘human rights should be the core concern of foreign policy’ after
apartheid (Mandela 1993) was often cited immediately after the ANC
took office as evidence of a commitment to encourage democracy abroad.
A statement of foreign policy intentions at the end of 1994, when the
ANC became the government, declared that ’South Africa will devote
its energies to the accomplishment of democratic ideals throughout the
world’. Although this was qualified by a passage noting the tension be-
tween democracy promotion and sovereignty, it promised: ‘Grateful for
the international solidarity which supported the anti-apartheid cause, a
democratic South Africa will be in solidarity with all those whose strug-
gle continues’ (ANC 1994).
 This expression of foreign policy ‘idealism’ (Barber 2004:92) was
often contrasted with the ‘realism’ of the apartheid-era foreign policy
establishment and its intellectual camp-followers, who tended to see
foreign policy as a means of maximising economic advantage (Evans
1993). Concern for democracy and human rights was thus associated
with the new order’s foreign policy orientation. The most vigorous post-
apartheid foreign policy debate was not the interchange between gov-
ernment and opposition but that between the Department of Foreign
Affairs, the parliamentary foreign affairs committee dominated by the
now governing ANC and scholars and activists who had worked closely
with the new establishment and hoped to shape its policy. And a key
issue was the new government’s perceived failure to support the fight
for democracy in Africa and the world (Diescho 1996:7; Daniel 1995).
The post-apartheid government was charged with sins of omission
and commission. On the first score, with failing to take the democratic
lead which its provenance demanded: ‘the world expects more from a
democratic South Africa ... After a long struggle for human rights in this
country, our new democracy is viewed as a natural leader…’ (Seymour
1996:1). On the second, of feting dictators who were economically use-
ful – Indonesia’s Suharto’s 1997 state visit was still being cited as a
reproach to Mandela three years later (Sunday Times 30/1/2000) – or of
co-operating with African autocrats, such as Nigeria’s Abacha junta. The
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government insisted that a key aspect of its foreign policy was ‘univer-
sality’ – it would deal with all countries whatever it thought of their
‘internal or external policies’ (Barber 2004:92). But critics noted that
the claim that contact with an undemocratic government did not mean
endorsement were repeatedly made by those who retained links to the
apartheid government (du Preez 2007).
In this phase, the government’s commitment to promoting democ-
racy elsewhere seems matched neither by vigorous action nor by cred-
ibility among advocates of an active role.
Derring-Do In Nigeria and Lesotho, Speaking Loudly in SADC
The initial expectation that the ANC in government would carry the
democratic torch through Africa and the world were inevitably exagger-
ated. But so too was the claim that it had turned its back on promoting
democracy: as early as 1994, it intervened in Mozambique to support an
electoral process in difficulty (Barber 2004:100). Some eighteen months
after democracy was achieved, Mandela took an unprecedented stand
on a human rights issue – the execution, in late 1995, of the Nigerian
activist and author Ken Saro-Wiwa (Human Rights Watch 1996). He
reacted angrily, calling for sanctions against the Nigerian junta and its
expulsion from the Commonwealth – a response which was said to have
‘pitched South Africa way ahead of the position of any other African
government’ on Nigeria (Mail and Guardian 24/11/1995).
Since post-independence African heads of government tended to rally
together, Mandela’s intervention prompting anger from other govern-
ments on the continent. The Organisation of African Unity described
the call for sanctions as ‘not an African way’ of dealing with a problem
(Vale and Maseko 1998:272) while Liberia urged ‘…other African coun-
tries to prevail on President Mandela not to allow South Africa to be
used in the division and undermining of African solidarity’ (Venter
1996:2). Mandela was seen, it was claimed, to be acting in the ‘white
man’s way’, following a ‘Western’ approach (Diescho 1996:9). Vigor-
ous action against Nigeria by African states did not ensue and South
Africa seems to have decided that discretion was the better part of val-
our: in an address to parliament in May 1996, then deputy president
Thabo Mbeki argued that South Africa did not have the leverage to
dictate to Nigeria. He suggested that Mandela had been set up for fail-
ure by western leaders, some of whom were protecting oil profits and
Nigerian assets in their countries (Adebajo 2006).
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This experience did not deter South Africa from an aggressive and
very risky intervention to protect an elected neighbouring government
which seemed under threat from a military coup. In September 1998,
South Africa and Botswana, acting formally on behalf of the Southern
African Development Community (SADC), despatched troops to the
neighbouring kingdom of Lesotho after its elected prime minister,
Pakalitha Mosilisi, requested help because he feared a coup. The incur-
sion initially appeared disastrous and encountered widespread criticism:
the troops faced armed resistance and intervention prompted widespread
looting. In the fullness of time, however, it could be said to have been
justified by democracy’s restoration in Lesotho: academic critics of the
action labelled the intervention an ‘unlikely success’ after elections in
2002 (Southall 2003).
Nor were Mandela and Mbeki discouraged from supporting democ-
racy in the SADC region and further afield. In late 1997, after events in
Southern Africa created fears of a retreat from democracy, Mandela used
his office as chair of SADC to raise concerns:
At some point therefore, we, as a regional organisation, must reflect
on how far we support the democratic process and respect for human
rights. Can we continue to give comfort to member states whose ac-
tions go so diametrically against the values and principles we hold so
dear and for which we struggled so long and so hard? Where we have,
as we sadly do, instances of member states denying their citizens …
basic rights, what should we as an organisation do or say? (Mandela
1997)
Months later, Mbeki was as blunt, satirising governance ills on the con-
tinent, including ballot-box stuffing (Mbeki 1998). Neither seemed to
have been cowed by the disapproval of their peers (which was said to
have greeted these interventions too) or to have been seduced into si-
lence by expediency.
While this phase is usually associated primarily with the Mandela
administration, and in particular its later period, one aspect endured
into the Mbeki presidency: twice, in Zambia and Malawi, he intervened
to dissuade presidents from seeking a third term in office in the face of
mobilised public opposition (Lodge n.d).
In this phase, South Africa is doing much of what first phase critics
want it to do – energetically pursuing democracy, even if this means clash-
ing with autocrats. Advocates of democracy promotion now accepted
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that it shared their interest (Solomon 1997). But assertive, public, de-
mocracy promotion was giving way to a more modest approach.
Speaking (Largely) in Code
In the third phase, which continues into the present, South Africa con-
tinues to play a role in democracy promotion but influence and inter-
vention is tailored not to confront African leaders and is justified on
grounds other than democracy’s merits.
First, interventions are presented not as democracy promotion but as
contributions to conflict resolution. They are pursued within a context
in which South Africa seeks to assist other societies in applying the in-
clusive negotiated settlement model which ended apartheid:
The most consistent thread in South Africa’s post-1994 foreign policy
forays lay in its efforts to ‘export’ its model of conflict resolution to
other situations: this consisted of painstaking compromise and con-
sensus-building and the assimilation of rivals into new, democratic
systems … Pretoria tried this in Mozambique, the former Zaire, Ni-
geria, Angola and Lesotho (Marais 1999).
This approach has also been applied to two major international con-
flicts, Northern Ireland and Palestine. While the most impact may have
been achieved not in Africa but in Northern Ireland, where Sinn Fein
President Gerry Adams insists that engagement with the ANC helped
persuade his movement to abandon violence and pursue a political set-
tlement (Adams 2005), continuing attempts to broker peace in Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo (Department of Foreign Affairs 2006) and
Burundi (SABC News 17/6/2006) have produced processes which could
yield inclusive democratic orders. A key element is participation in peace-
keeping: ‘overall South African peacekeeping deployments in African
countries total 2,800 personnel’ (Lodge n.d.).
These interventions, since they entail an attempt to include all politi-
cal actors in the process and are meant to produce a free and fair elec-
tion, are attempts to democratise as well as to prevent violence. But
they are presented not as democracy promotion exercises, but as at-
tempts to settle conflicts.
Second, an attempt to channel democratising influences through multi-
lateral, continental, institutions. Thus, South Africa has played a key
role in establishing the African Union (AU) and developing its New
Partnership for African Development (Nepad). Nepad, adopted in 2002,
includes a declaration which commits African governments to:
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The rule of law, the equality of all citizens before the law and the
liberty of the individual, individual and collective freedoms, includ-
ing the right to form political parties and trade unions… (NEPAD
Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Gov-
ernance, Section 7).
The AU has also adopted the OAU’s proposal to establish an African
Peer Review Mechanism in which civil society is to participate and which
tests, among other issues, the state of democracy (OAU 2002). South
Africa has sought to act as an exemple by submitting itself to peer re-
view. This approach is consistent with an oft-stated South African con-
cern for multi-lateralism as a means of settling disputes which, in the
view of some scholars, is evidence of its status as an actual or aspiring
‘middle power’ (Wood 1998:1).
Third, a democratising influence is exerted through instruments which
purport to have another purpose. Thus, Nepad is concerned to promote
development and ‘good governance’. Its democracy promoting elements
are phrased almost as technical aspects of ‘good governance’ which are
required if the continent is to achieve growth, modernity – and foreign
aid: its Democracy and Political Governance Initiative is presented as a
means to ‘contribute to strengthening the political and administrative
framework of participating countries... It is strengthened by and sup-
ports the Economic Governance Initiative, with which it shares key fea-
tures’ (Nepad 2001:17). The Peer Review Mechanism is not presented
as a measure of democratic achievement, but of a more general commit-
ment to the growth-oriented and developmental goals of Nepad:
The primary purpose of the APRM is to foster the adoption of poli-
cies, standards and practices that lead to political stability, high eco-
nomic growth, sustainable development and accelerated sub-regional
and continental economic integration… (OAU 2002:2).
In this phase, South Africa has continued to play a role in supporting
democracy promotion, but one performed almost by stealth. Its role is
less open to challenge, and less threatening to power holders. But its
impact is greatly reduced by the need to move at the pace of actors who
may be resistant to democracy.
The Fatal Flaw? Zimbabwe
If South Africa’s response to the challenge of democracy promotion had
stopped at the examples cited thus far, its role could be judged to be
benign if sometimes ineffectual. Lodge points out that it has assisted
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electoral processes, supported ‘politically negotiated conflict resolution’
in which civil society participation has been encouraged and persuaded
reluctant presidents to observe term limits’ (Lodge n.d.). But this rela-
tively positive evaluation must be greatly modified by its failure to meet
the moral and strategic challenge of its most conspicuous foreign policy
test: Zimbabwe.
The events which began when President Robert Mugabe’s govern-
ment lost a constitutional referendum in 2000, in which attempts to
defeat him at the polls have been beaten back by a sustained and often
violent authoritarian onslaught, have been exhaustively analysed
(McKinley 2006). Suffice it to say here that South Africa has, during
the tenure of former President Mbeki, offered substantial aid and com-
fort to the Zimbabwean regime by sending official delegations which
endorsed elections regarded by independent sources as fraudulent, often
ignoring the opposition, seeking to temper international action against
Mugabe and remaining silent on human rights abuses.
South Africa has insisted through much of the conflict that it is adopt-
ing an even-handed approach which relies on ‘quiet diplomacy’ and is
seeking an inclusive negotiated settlement (Sachikonye 2005). But, since
Zimbabwean democracy has continued to decline throughout this pe-
riod and South Africa has appeared to condone this, claims of neutrality
have lacked credibility. As a Zimbabwean civil society activist said of
official claims that South Africa was avoiding unproductive ‘megaphone
diplomacy’ – ‘You are engaged in megaphone diplomacy. But you are
pointing the megaphone in the wrong direction.’ (Round-table, Institute
for Security Studies, Pretoria 2003).
Critics who insist that South Africa has not exerted the pressure it
could on Zimbabwe include not only the Zimbabwean opposition but
former President Mbeki’s brother Moeletsi, deputy chair of the SA In-
ternational Affairs, who has consistently urged a more assertive stance
(Lodge n.d.), as well as civil society organisations in Zimbabwe and South
Africa. Even if the complaint that South Africa has supported a sus-
tained attempt by an illegitimate government to crush opposition is re-
jected in favour of the government view that it has been trying to resolve
a difficult problem in the only possible way, Zimbabwe remains a nota-
ble failure because Mbeki and his government insisted that they were
trying to reach a settlement and none is in sight.
More importantly, the South African response to Zimbabwe has se-
verely tarnished the effectiveness of its promotion of democracy. It has
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created an impression of inconsistency and thus expediency (du Preez
2007) – South Africa may well not be able, after Zimbabwe, to return to
more vigorous promotions of democracy of the sort it attempted in the
second phase, even if circumstances seemed to warrant it, because this
would raise obvious questions about why abuses were permitted in Zim-
babwe but not elsewhere. In effect, the Zimbabwean response may have
ensured that South African democratisation efforts will remain limited
and conducted by stealth.
It is also possible that, because the response has been justified as a
strategy to achieve an inclusive settlement, it may have damaged the
credibility of this strategy too. If inclusive negotiation means condoning
anything power holders do to the powerless, it is unclear what constraints
it places on the former and what hope it offers the latter. While the
inclusive style may still enjoy credibility in cases such as Burundi and
DRC, where both power holders and challengers have access to arms
and the one cannot be considered to be at the mercy of the other, they
may now be discredited in cases in which citizens require protection from
power holders who hold a monopoly on coercion. It may also weaken
South Africa’s already limited influence within the AU and SADC. A
key weakness of the multi-lateral instruments South Africa has helped
to shape is that they have never been used against Zimbabwe – they
have, in reality, never been used against an incumbent government and
have seemed to be designed to protect incumbents.1 The impression
that they are cosmetic or a means of shoring up existing power relations
not only reduces their credibility among actors working for democracy, but
among power holders who do not expect to be held to account by them.
Zimbabwe is, therefore, not simply a limited stain on South Africa’s
democratisation record. It severely compromises the credibility and stra-
tegic viability of its role as a democratiser. In essence, it appears to con-
firm that South Africa’s role as a promoter of democracy is now largely
limited to doing what power-holders will allow it to do.
The Manacled Giant? Explaining the Limits
What are we to make of this experience?
One influential strain of analysis sees it as a reminder of the limits
which face democracy promotion ambitions (Barber 2004; Lodge n.d.).
In this view, the new South Africa made an energetic attempt to spread
democracy but was then forced by reality to retreat into a more nuanced
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stance which acknowledged the limits of foreign policy ‘idealism’, mak-
ing significant concessions to a more sober ‘realism’.
The evidence for this shift is said to be contained in a 1997 ANC
discussion document (ANC 1997) tabled at its conference that year.
While it repeated ‘idealist’ intentions, it placed ‘at the top of the inter-
national agenda’ developing a just and equitable world order and also
added opposition to colonialism and neo-colonialism as a goal. This was
seen as a dilution of the human rights commitment (Barber 2004:119).
The document also, it is argued, scaled down the ANC’s human rights
ambitions, arguing that South Africa should not ‘overestimate ourselves
as a middle income country’. It cited the Nigerian case as an example of
the dangers of acting alone and argued for action through multi-lateral
bodies. This change, with an agreement on foreign arms purchases
‘(which) signalled new recognition … of the importance of military ca-
pability if South Africa was to exercise pan-African influence’ signalled,
it is argued, the emergence of a foreign policy which began to acquire
consistent characteristics that were to endure into Mbeki’s administra-
tion. Key features are a stress on multi-lateralism consistent with an
embrace of a role as a ‘middle power’ and a ‘self effacing posture on the
continent’ (Lodge n.d.).
Two aspects are crucial to this view. First, an assumed unity of pur-
pose within the ANC. While divisions are at times mentioned in passing
(Barber 2004:120), consensus on the need for the promotion of democ-
racy and human rights is assumed. Second, policy is seen to evolve in
response to external constraints. The chief obstacle to a more assertive
and effective policy is external reality which moderates an ‘idealist’ con-
sensus as an eager but inexperienced new government comes to learn
that the world is not necessarily hospitable to energetic intervention in
support of democracy.
In fairness, the pursuit of democracy in other countries is not purely
an act of will: intervention faces daunting obstacles, generally and in
Africa in particular. But, in South Africa’s case, the domestic dimension
was more important in shaping willingness to promote democracy and in
limiting the inclination to do so more generally and vigorously. The ANC’s
commitment to democracy promotion was not unambiguous and nor
was there necessarily consensus on its desirability. Because it locates the
limits on democracy promotion purely in the external environment, the
view discussed here misreads the dynamics which shaped South Africa’s
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policy and action. It cannot explain why responses which were widely
seen as ‘expedient’ contradictions of the ANC’s democracy and human
rights commitment were evident before the Nigerian crisis indicated the
limits of ‘idealist intervention’ – or why these approaches were also pur-
sued in Asia where South Africa had never tried to promote democracy
and can therefore not have abandoned idealism in the face of reality.
In Asia, the ‘universality’ which prompted Mandela to fete Suharto
could hardly have been prompted by a chastening encounter with reality.
Nor, although it followed the Nigerian events, could the decision in 1996
to recognise the People’s Republic of China, which was not a democracy,
rather than Taiwan, which had just become one. The ANC hoped to deal
with both countries, but neither’s democratic credentials were at issue:
since Taiwan had contributed generously to the ANC’s election expenses
and the post-apartheid government’s reconstruction programme, debate
centred around the economic merits of the two relationships – where
principle was raised in Taiwan’s support, the rationale was again ‘univer-
sality’, not democracy (Barber 2004:106-108).
The account is further undermined by the fact that ‘idealist’ inter-
ventions such as Mandela’s 1997 speech to SADC, Mbeki’s 1998 speech
satirising African autocrats and interventions to dissuade neighbouring
presidents from seeking third terms followed the Nigerian events and
that two of these interventions were attempted after the 1997 discus-
sion document.
Nor, finally, do these analyses allow for diversity within the ANC on
the merits of democracy promotion itself. Within Africa, the period be-
fore Saro-Wiwa’s execution was marked by a sympathetic South African
attitude to the military government – its foreign minister, Chief Tom
Ikimi, was invited to visit Pretoria (Barber 2004:109) and used his time
to lobby for his government. Delegations of ‘academics’ linked to the
junta were hosted by the foreign affairs department.2 This enthusiasm
for ‘constructive engagement’ or tacit support for the junta did not ema-
nate from Mandela – he was said to have been embarrassed by it (Mail
and Guardian 22/11/1995). The architect, circumstantial evidence sug-
gested, was Mbeki. He had been the ANC representative in Nigeria
(Barber 2004:16) where he is said to have had contact with Abacha and
other military figures. He took a lively interest in foreign affairs and was
often seen by insiders as the ‘real’ foreign minister. And it was he who
delivered the 1996 speech suggesting that Mandela had been ‘set up’ by
the West. Policy on Nigeria was clearly not unanimous.
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Despite this, the 1997 document is presented as a unified ANC re-
sponse to external complexity. A closer look invites a different view.
Unlike other ANC and government documents on this question it offers
a left-wing analysis of international realities, albeit a pragmatic one. While
welcoming some consequences of the end of the Cold War, it adds:
the collapse of the Soviet Union had the effect of reducing interna-
tional support for national liberation struggles, as well as the ab-
sence of space and support for developing countries to develop alter-
native economic and political policies relatively independently from
the ideas set out by the Western capitalist countries (ANC 1997).
It sees a ‘need to break neo-colonial relations between Africa and the
world’s economic powers’. And, while endorsing multi-party democracy,
it observes that ‘multi-party systems have been introduced in Africa
in circumstances where other conditions have had the effect of weaken-
ing the capacity of governments to stop the explosion of ethnic war’
(ANC 1997). It is of some importance that, when the document was
drafted, the chair of the ANC National Executive’s International Affairs
committee was SA Communist Party general secretary Blade Nzimande
(ANC 1997b).
This does not mean that the document was the ANC left’s attempt
to take over foreign policy. It could not have been published if the ANC
leadership did not want it circulated and Nzimande was not the only
person responsible for international policy. There are many continuities
between it and other government and ANC policy pronouncements. And
it does foreshadow some later foreign policy directions – a more active
role in championing Southern concerns in world trade negotiations and
a part in designing the AU.
But parts of the document take a stance unusual for ANC foreign
policy documents before or after it. It is the one document at the time to
warn of limits to multi-party democracy, and some of the approaches it
advocates, such as ‘the strengthening of party-to-party relations with
progressive parties in the region and the continent’ or ‘cementing soli-
darity amongst the progressive forces in the world based on the princi-
ples of anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism and a democratic world order’
have not been adopted. This suggests that it was not an announcement
of a new direction but a proposal, some of which was ignored. This makes
it the product of wrestling within the ANC, not only between sections of
the movement but within them, not over how to promote democracy but
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over whether this should be a priority at all. And the fact that parts of it
have proved influential and parts have not may be a product of the ex-
tent to which ANC thinking on these issues is fraught with ambiguities
on whether to promote democracy as well as on how to do it.
Democracy promotion is an uncertain and complex undertaking
(Carothers 1999) – in Africa, particularly so. It can invite resistance from
threatened power holders (Carothers 2006). And, even where those in
power do not overtly oppose it, they may be able to employ effective
stratagems to ensure that ‘democratisation’ does not threaten them. Since
democracy promotion inevitably entails incursions into Westphalian
understandings of sovereignty, governing elites can insist that they are
being subjected to the imperial attentions of meddling foreigners. They
are helped by the reality that the line between democracy promotion
and imperial imposition can be exceedingly thin (Kurlantzick 2004). Even
where democracy promotion has the active consent of the governing elite,
crafting appropriate interventions may often require an intricate under-
standing of local complexities well beyond those undertaking the inter-
vention (Reitzes and Friedman 2001).
In Africa, these complexities are enhanced. Despite a seemingly dra-
matic movement towards democracy – 49 of its 52 countries held com-
petitive elections between 1989 and 1997 (Bratton and van de Walle
1997) – substantive progress towards democratic regimes is uncertain.
Electoral competition is often accompanied by authoritarian features:
many of the continent’s elites are adept at offering a semblance of demo-
cratic appearance while abrogating its substance (Joseph 1998). In sev-
eral important cases, states remain fractured by deep-rooted conflicts –
in some cases after elections whose results are disputed. And, in many
African countries, the state is weak and largely insulated from the social
pressures which might keep elites accountable to citizens (Mkandiwire
and Soludo 1999; Clapham 1999). In these cases, plausible domestic
partners able to advance democratisation are difficult to locate. South
Africa’s efforts have, therefore, been constrained by the complexities of
the environment within which democracy promotion must be pursued.
For post-apartheid South Africa, intervention in support of democ-
racy is particularly complex. The support of other African states was a
key resource for the ANC during the ‘struggle’ period – states such as
Nigeria lavishly supported the ANC’s 1994 election campaign, prompt-
ing charges by the opposition that foreign policy was shaped by the ANC’s
‘electoral debts’ (Sampson 1999:560). During this engagement, links
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were forged with African governing elites, making ANC leaders reluc-
tant to do battle against leaders with whom they had worked for years.
The fact that democracy was achieved by a negotiated transition rather
than a military defeat of the apartheid order also offered autocrats a
handy means of deflecting South African appeals to democratise by in-
sisting that the post-apartheid government was a puppet of white inter-
ests: ‘The bitter Nigerian response envisaged Mandela as the black leader
of a white state – implying that his white officials … had led him by the
nose…’ (Barber 2004:115). Vulnerability to being portrayed as a serv-
ant of the white establishment may explain why, in the last year of the
Mandela administration, Mugabe was able to isolate South Africa within
the SADC when he felt threatened by it (Field 2003:360).
Some scholars and diplomats suggest that post-apartheid South Af-
rica found itself in much the same position as Germany and Japan after
World War Two – its democratisation did not outweigh its neighbours’
memories of it as a domineering, expansionist, power. While there were
expectations that the newly democratic state would play a benign role in
the lives of its neighbours, energetic intervention would be portrayed as
an attempt to revive past hegemony. This factor, coupled with fears of
South African economic power, limit South African influence in Africa
(Vale and Maseko 1998) – on democracy as well as on other issues. But,
as important as these external constraints were, the key obstacles to
effective democracy promotion by South Africa were domestic.
The Trojan Horse: Domestic Constraints
Democracy promotion, like other foreign policy goals, is inevitably fil-
tered through a domestic political lens which constrains and shapes policy.
The ‘realist’ notion that states always seek to act in their own inter-
ests (Walz 1959) has, therefore, been criticised for viewing the state as
a ‘unitary’ actor which harbours only one conception of its interests. By
contrast, models such as Robert Putnam’s theory of the two-level game
(Putnam 1998), which analyses international bargaining as the outcome
of an interplay between the domestic and the external, stress the role of
domestic interest group conflict on international behaviour. This is not
the place to discuss models for understanding the domestic dimension
of foreign policy (Friedman 2005). Suffice it to say that there is a vital
domestic dimension to democracy promotion which often makes it the
subject of heated contest in democracy promoting countries (Youngs
2006). Accounts of democracy promotion which ignore the crucial role
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of ambiguity and contest in the democracy-promoting country – and
therefore assume a coherence and consensus on what is to be done if not
on how to do it – are likely to offer a misleading picture. The South
African case illustrates this.
Promoting What?
Contrary to conventional wisdom, ensuring that Africa becomes demo-
cratic is not a core concern of the post-apartheid government.
This does not mean that the ANC in government has turned its back
on its ‘freedom struggle’. It has remained true to it, for the fight against
apartheid was not primarily a struggle for democracy but for majority
rule: a seminal history is, appropriately, not called an account of the
‘Black Man’s Struggle for Democracy’ (Roux 1964). The ANC and its
allies were not unsympathetic to democracy. But the primary rationale
of the ‘struggle’ was ‘national liberation’ – the freeing of black people
from racial minority rule (Johnson 2003). Democracy and human rights
were invaluable tools in that ‘struggle’ and this ensured a more enthusi-
astic commitment to democracy than might have been expected after a
brutal conflict. But they were means, not ends. Similarly, South African
democracy is not a product of a fight for democratic freedoms but of a
balance of power which ensured that majority rule would be achieved by
negotiating a liberal democratic constitution (Friedman 1995).
This concern with racial subjugation did not end when apartheid fell.
Post-apartheid politics have been underpinned by a pervasive theme often
not stated overtly: whites expect a black government to fail and the leaders
of that government know they do.3 It is, therefore, a key preoccupation
of much of the new governing elite to show that black people can govern
an industrialised society (Friedman 1993; Friedman 2004). The chief
concern of post-apartheid governance has not been to deepen democ-
racy or pursue growth but to prove white prejudices wrong by showing
that black people can govern.
This also clearly underpins understanding of engagement with the
rest of Africa. Mbeki’s 1998 speech poking fun at Africa’s failure to get
its house in order looks at the continent through the eyes of the citizens
of Dead Man’s Creek, Mississippi, who are told that an African Renais-
sance has begun, removing them from the obligation to pay for inter-
vention in Africa, but discover, through news bulletins, that nothing on
the continent had changed (Mbeki 1998). African leaders are thus be-
having in ways which ensure that white, Western people have a low opin-
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ion of them. The key objective of South African strategy in Africa is a
continent which can win respect by becoming the kind of place which
bigots believe it can never be: democracy is embraced as a means to this
end. It is significant for example that the Nepad document devotes only
two pages out of 59 to discussing the details of its democracy and politi-
cal governance initiative (Nepad 2001:17-19).
This explains the patterns described here far more plausibly than the
notion of an enthusiastic democratiser running up against unpleasant
realities. If South Africa’s democracy promotion is situated within a con-
cern to refute international prejudice, some of the ambiguity and un-
evenness can be understood. Is the goal better served by ignoring or
defending democratic deficits in Africa because they can only enhance
white Western prejudice – or by highlighting them in the hope of chang-
ing them? The answer is both, depending on circumstances and context.
In Zimbabwe, the former prevails, for the conflict is the only one dis-
cussed here in which criticisms of government behaviour are closely tied
to race; Europe and America are often accused of highlighting violations
in Zimbabwe because white farmers have been among the victims in
that country (Nzimande 2006). It is far easier to see criticism of Mugabe
as a pandering to bigotry than a similar response to Nigeria or Lesotho.
Nor should the tendency to cloak democratisation in developmental
and technical garb – or to present it as a by-product of conflict resolution
– be seen purely as a manoeuvre to seduce authoritarians into democra-
tisation. South Africa promotes inclusive settlements and urges the adop-
tion of democracy as part of a wider attempt to enhance the effective-
ness and international credibility of African states because it sees de-
mocracy as a means to a wider end. The approach is less a response to
external realities as an expression of the South African governing elite’s
understanding of Africa’s needs and challenges.
The attempt to ‘export’ the South African model of conflict resolu-
tion and democratisation is also consistent with this concern. One symp-
tom of the desire to refute prejudice is an elite preoccupation with South
Africa as a source of ‘world class’ contributions which demonstrate Afri-
cans’ ability to enrich humanity – anything from the post-1994 constitu-
tion to financial services may be presented as ‘world class’ to show what
the country has to offer (Friedman 2005b). Exporting a model of con-
flict resolution is one further way of demonstrating ‘world class’ status.
That South Africa’s desire to encourage democracy is part of a wider
concern to restore black African self-esteem does not devalue it. But it
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does introduce dilemmas, ambiguities and contradictions which explain
the different trajectories it has taken and the varying perspectives to-
wards it within the ruling elite. At times, differing strategies and views
have existed side-by-side – in the same policy documents or in the ap-
proaches of the same politicians. This has less to do with confusion than
with the reality that the pursuit of democracy has to be weighed against
other goals to which it is subordinate.
A full understanding of South African democracy promotion requires
that this factor be combined with the paradoxical insularity of South
Africa’s international interventions.
 Promoting or Projecting?
Assumptions that South Africa is committed to a coherent project of
promoting democracy elsewhere are also partly based on a misappre-
hension of its elite’s relation to the world.
For decades, the contending forces in South Africa were locked in a
battle which was often played out in the world arena: winning world
support was a key component in the strategies of the apartheid govern-
ment and the ANC (Thomas 1996). The negotiation process which ended
apartheid was, during much of the first two years of the 1990s, playing as
much to a foreign audience as a domestic one. International influence
was significant in shaping negotiating positions (Landsberg 1995). This
dynamic forced the ANC into a diplomatic role which it performed with
great effect, raising expectations that foreign policy would be the arena
in which it would perform most proficiently in government.
But the concern for engagement with the world during the apartheid
era was, in an important sense, illusory: relations with other states and
actors was about apartheid and nothing else. A key preoccupation of the
apartheid government was winning international legitimacy (Mills and
Baynham 1994). The ANC’s international role was to deny it that: so
central was this focus that, for much of the exile period, guerrilla war,
dubbed ‘armed propaganda’ by the ANC leadership, was designed more
as a diplomatic weapon than an instrument to overthrow the white-ruled
state (Lodge 1984). As its campaign to win support for the anti-apart-
heid ‘struggle’ gathered momentum in the West, this required that it
remain fairly bland on international issues for fear of antagonising ma-
jor powers.
While the international context was strongly embedded in the con-
sciousness of whites and blacks, it was so only in the context of apart-
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heid. Within the resistance tradition of which the ANC was part, world
opinion was seen, excessively at times, as a key to freedom. One of the
earliest responses to segregation by the Western educated leaders who
founded the ANC was to send a delegation to London to request the
British king to intervene on behalf of his black subjects (Roux 1964:110);
petitioning the colonial authorities was a central theme in ANC strategy
until the 1940s. Nor was reliance on external influence restricted to the
elite: in 1921, Wellington Butelezi, a herbalist and preacher, rallied a
mass movement by promising that black Americans would arrive in aero-
planes to free black South Africans (Roux 1964:140-141). The reliance
on external intervention was an expression of real or perceived power-
lessness which remained a crucial element of resistance strategy into the
1990s. In exile, the ANC established diplomatic missions throughout
the world and was afforded a presence in significantly more countries
than the apartheid government (Evans 1996). Its aim, however, was sin-
gle-minded – to win support for the fight against apartheid.
There was, therefore, much interaction with the world – but the goal
was not to establish what South Africa could do for the world but what
the world could do for South Africa. ‘This forced the ANC … to develop
a narrow and highly parochial view of the world’ (Diescho 1996:11-12).
The oft-stated expectation that a movement which had made human
rights virtually its raison d’etre during the apartheid period would cham-
pion this cause vigorously after defeating the system might have made
good polemics, but was faulty analysis. A stress on seeking resources to
sustain the post-apartheid order was a continuity, not an inexplicable
departure from tradition.
Again, this explains key aspects of the democracy promotion agenda,
in particular the complaints of expediency. ‘Universality’ can also be traced
back to a desire to get on with anyone who has anything to offer South
Africa, whatever their human rights record. Asked in 1990 for his re-
sponse to human rights abuses in other countries, Mandela replied: ‘Our
attitude to any country is determined by (its) attitude .... towards our
struggle’ (ABC Nightline 21/6/1990). For the ANC, apartheid was not
simply a human rights issue – it was the human rights issue. The highest
form of human rights commitment was, therefore, opposition to apart-
heid. Domestic human rights performance was, in comparison, unim-
portant.
This raises the possibility that one spur for democracy promotion
was not ‘idealist’ concern but a desire to impress trading partners and
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sources of investment. Certainly, an emphasis on ‘selling’ the new de-
mocracy to investors and trading partners – one foreign service cadet
complained that he felt he was being trained to become a ‘global ham-
burger salesman (Exchange, Foreign Service Institute 1995) – was a key
feature of early post-apartheid foreign relations. The inward looking
nature of outward relations made it possible to view a scramble to per-
suade anyone with money to direct it towards a new South Africa not as
a compromise with democracy but a means of promoting it since the
growth of post-apartheid South Africa was the ultimate contribution to
democracy and human rights. Democracy promotion could be, partly,
another means to that end.
As the end of apartheid has become distant, this influence may seem
to have diminished – ‘self-effacing’ democracy promotion is unlikely to
help investment. But the domestic focus persists, most notably in re-
sponses to Zimbabwe. The conflict is one between a ‘liberation’ party
which is seen to have won independence for its country and a trade
union-led civil society movement. While the ANC leadership has achieved
electoral dominance, a significant check on its power and challenge to its
leadership is the Congress of SA Trade Unions (Cosatu), ironically an
ANC ally, and a range of civil society organisations (Friedman 1999).
While speculation that Cosatu might form a worker’s party to challenge
the ANC is unlikely to be vindicated (Harvey 2002), this possibility
clearly weighs on the minds of ANC leaders. It is, therefore, perhaps
significant that, when a senior official in the Presidency was asked at a
confidential meeting why South Africa seemed cool towards the Zimba-
bwean opposition, he replied that it was led by trade unionists who were
never equipped to run countries (Discussion March 2004). The obvious
implication is that the Mbeki administration saw the idea of a trade
union-led civil society coalition unseating a ‘liberation’ party as a prec-
edent unhelpful to South Africa’s development. What the Zimbabwean
conflict may say about South Africa was far more important than what
South Africa might say about the conflict.
This issue would not arise if the future of South African democracy
seemed largely settled. Inevitably, it is not. Only fifteen years after a
severe conflict in which none of the parties saw democracy as an end in
itself, its future and merits are still in doubt. This, with South Africa’s
‘inward outwardness’, means that promoting democracy elsewhere will
inevitably be filtered through a response which keeps a weather eye on
the implications for South Africa’s own prospects. And it may well be
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that a ‘self effacing’ approach, in which the democratisation burden can
be shared and subsumed into other objectives, best fits the circumstances
of a new elite uncertain of the future of the society which it governs. If
South Africa’s current power holders were more certain of its prospects,
they may have clearer ideas of what they would like to promote elsewhere.
Conclusion: What can be Learnt?
Does South Africa’s experience say anything about the circumstances of
one country at one time or does it have a more general application?
While the case has unusual features, it does have more general appli-
cation. It warns against expecting a coherent approach from states whose
democracy is far from established and who will inevitably filter their role
abroad through their own ambivalence and uncertainty about their fu-
ture. But, more generally, it warns against too sanguine a view of the
capacity of states to promote democracy elsewhere – not only because
the external constraints are very real but also because the attempt will
be filtered through domestic concerns which ensure that democracy pro-
motion may say as much about the frailties, ambiguities and dilemmas
of the promoting country as it does about those among whom it is to be
promoted.
This does not mean that claims by states, including those which are
newly democratic, to be promoting democracy in other states should be
discounted – even South Africa’s modest, sometimes incoherent and
often ineffective strategy has achieved democracy in Lesotho and the
possibility of inclusive government in Burundi and DRC. And its influ-
ence on Nepad and the AU, while not apparent in concrete action yet,
may still bear fruit, subtly constraining autocrats. But it does mean that
the already sobering realisation that democracy promoting countries may
be constrained from effectiveness by inadequate knowledge and a need
to co-exist with ‘targeted’ governments must be complemented by a rec-
ognition of the key role of domestic preoccupations in further limiting
the possibilities of democracy promotion.
 Notes
1. In 2002, the AU initially refused to recognise Madagascar’s President, Marc
Ravalomanana, who defeated incumbent Didier Ratsiraka after the Supreme
Court declared him the lawful winner. His opponents insisted that this manner
of winning was ‘unconstitutional’ and therefore violated the AU’s ban on
recognising governments who attain power unconstitutionally. Even after his
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victory was recognised by all parties, the AU ban stood. While it was later
lifted, it was seen as evidence that provisions which appeared to entrench
democratic principle were being used to protect incumbents. Afrol News
‘Madagascar returns to normalcy without Africa’ 11/7/2002 http://
www.afrol.com/News2002/mad042_au_reconciliation.htm
2. The author was director of a research institute at the time. It was contacted
by the Department of Foreign Affairs and asked to meet a delegation from a
Nigerian research institute. Most members of the delegation held military
rank and we were informed by Nigerian exiles that they were closely linked
to the Abacha government.
 3 The attitude is not restricted to South African whites. A (white) mining
executive tells of visiting fund managers in North America and Western
Europe in an attempt to raise investment capital. His and his colleagues’
pitch consisted largely of references to healthy economic fundamentals and
progress in resolving conflicts. ‘But you have a black government’ many of
his audiences responded. Discussion, senior mining executive, 1995.
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